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Abstract
We construct a model where incumbents can either acquire basic innovations
from entrepreneurs, or wait and acquire developed innovations from entrepreneurial
ﬁrms supported by venture capitalists. We show that venture-backed entrepreneur-
ial ﬁrms have an incentive to overinvest in development vis à vis incumbents due to
strategic product market eﬀects on the sales price of a developed innovation. This
will trigger preemptive acquisitions by incumbents, thus increasing the reward for
entrepreneurial innovations. We also show that venture capital can emerge in equi-
librium if venture capitalists have cost advantages, or if development is associated
with double moral hazard problems.
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There is a growing awareness of the role played by venture capitalists in the innovation
process.1 Venture capitalists have come to specialize in ﬁnancing early-stage investment
for entrepreneurs and providing business experience.2 In a study on venture capital and
innovation, Kortum and Lerner (2000) ﬁnd increases in venture capital activity in an
industry to be associated with signiﬁcantly higher patenting rates. Moreover, Hellmann
and Puri (2000) ﬁnd venture capital to be associated with a signiﬁc a n tr e d u c t i o ni nt h e
time required for bringing a product to the market. This raises the question of why
venture-backed ﬁrms are more aggressive and more successful than incumbent ﬁrms in
bringing commercialized innovations to the market.
The starting point of this paper is that the exit of venture-backed ﬁrms often takes
place through a sale to an incumbent ﬁrm.34Figure 1.1 depicts the quarterly value of
exits through M&As and IPOs, respectively, in the US in the period 1999 to 2005. Note
that M&As dominate as the exit mode, except at the beginning of the period. Moreover,
according to The Economist (1999)5, innovators know that incumbent ﬁrms in highly
concentrated markets are those willing to pay the most for innovations, as indicated by
the following quote: “Companies like Cisco, Intel and Microsoft recognize the threat posed
by nimble young ﬁrms getting technologies to market at unimaginable speeds,” says Red
1 See, for instance, Gompers and Lerner (2001).
2 Hellmann and Puri (2002) ﬁnd evidence of US venture capital being related to a variety of
professionalization measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans
and the hiring of a marketing VP. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2004) ﬁnd similar evidence
for European venture capital.
3 For instance, Cochrane (2005) uses data over the period 1987 to June 2000 from the Venture-
One database and shows that 20 % of the ventures were acquired, 21 % were IPOs, 9% went out
of business, while 49% remained private. Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) found similar ﬁgures.
4 Granstrand and Sjölander (1990) present evidence from Sweden and Hall (1990) presents
evidence from the US that ﬁrms acquire innovative targets to gain access to their technologies. In
the biotech industry, Lerner and Merges (1998) note that acquisitions are important for know-
how transfers. OECD (2002) argues that established ﬁrms often acquire ﬁrms to access new
technologies.
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Figure 1.1: The value of exits through M&A and IPO in the US. Source: Thomson Venture
Economics/National Venture Capital Association.
Herring’s Brian Taptich. “And they’re willing to pay extremely high premiums to protect
their franchises.”6
In the literature, informational advantages and abilities have been suggested to explain
why venture capitalists are more aggressive and more successful in creating marketable
innovations.7 We add to this literature by showing that venture-backed ﬁrms selling in-
novations to incumbents in concentrated markets have a stronger incentive to develop
basic innovations into commercialized innovations than incumbent ﬁrms, due to strategic
product market eﬀects on the sales price of the innovation. In turn, this will increase
the price of basic innovations, thereby triggering a larger number of such innovations by
entrepreneurs.
To this end, we present a model where in the initial stage of the interaction, there is an
6 An example is Cerent, which was acquired by Cisco at $6.9 billion.
7 See, for instance, Gompers and Lerner (2001) for an overview of the empirical literature and
Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004) for a theoretical contribution.
3entrepreneur investing in an innovative activity that might lead to the creation of a basic
innovation, which is novel but requires additional development for commercial use. But
the entrepreneur cannot develop the basic innovation herself and, in a second stage, she
may sell it to one of the incumbent ﬁrms. Alternatively, the entrepreneur can seek support
from one among several venture capitalists competing to provide expertise and ﬁnancial
s u p p o r tt od e v e l o pt h eb a s i ci n n o v a t i o n .W em o d e lt h es a l eo ft h eb a s i ci n n o v a t i o na sa
ﬁrst-price perfect information auction, where incumbent ﬁrms and venture capitalists bid
for the basic innovation.8 The buyer (incumbent or venture capitalist) will then invest in
the development of the innovation, which will increase the possessor’s proﬁt, but decrease
the proﬁts of the rival incumbents in the product market. The venture-backed ﬁrm will
then exit by selling the developed innovation at a ﬁrst-price perfect information auction,
where the incumbents are the potential buyers. Given the innovation and development
pattern, the incumbents compete in oligopoly fashion in the product market in the ﬁnal
stage.
We ﬁrst show that a venture-backed ﬁrm has an incentive to develop the basic innova-
tion further than an incumbent ﬁrm, due to strategic product market eﬀects. The reason is
that an incumbent ﬁrm only takes into account how its own proﬁt increases when investing
in development. The venture-backed ﬁrm, in contrast, takes into account how the acqui-
sition price of the developed innovation is aﬀected. In equilibrium, the acquisition price
is shown to equal an incumbent ﬁrm’s valuation of obtaining the developed innovation
which, in turn, consists of the proﬁtf o rt h i sﬁrm of obtaining the developed innovation
net its proﬁt, if it is obtained by a rival ﬁrm. The venture capitalist thus exploits the fact
that investments in the development of the basic innovation increase the acquisition price,
not only by generating an increase in the acquirer’s proﬁt, but also through the negative
impact on the non-acquirer’s proﬁt (due to the development of more competitive assets).
8 All players in the model are completely informed about their own and other players’ char-
acteristics. This allows us to clearly attribute market force eﬀects, as opposed to, say, problems
of incomplete information, which have been extensively studied in the literature (see Gompers
and Lerner (2001) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2001).
4Then, we show that when venture capitalists and incumbent ﬁrms are equally eﬃcient
in developing basic innovations and compete to gain control over these, direct preemptive
acquisitions of basic innovations by incumbents occur. Incumbent ﬁr m st a k ei n t oa c c o u n t
that venture-backed ﬁrms will invest more aggressively in development and thus, preempt
such, for them, excessive investments in development. However, the presence of venture
capitalists, even when not active in equilibrium, will increase the price of basic innovations
which, in turn, induces a higher entrepreneurial eﬀort to innovate.
Consequently, to exist in equilibrium, venture capitalists must have some type of ad-
vantage. We then proceed by identifying three diﬀerent reasons why venture capitalist can
be active in equilibrium. First, if venture capitalists possess some type of cost advantages,
for instance due to a better ability to create incentives for entrepreneurs, they will be able
to outbid incumbents in the bidding over basic innovations. Second, incumbents might
prefer a late acquisition of a developed innovation to an early preemptive acquisition of a
basic innovation, if moral hazard problems are present. The reason is that underinvest-
ment due to a double moral hazard problem in the venture is countered by the above
identiﬁed overinvestment eﬀect in the venture-backed ﬁrm, bringing investments closer to
the ﬁrst-best choice of the acquirer. Third, its is shown that non-acquiring incumbents
gain more from a direct preemptive acquisition than the acquiring incumbent. This im-
plies that a coordination failure can emerge between incumbents, and a venture-capitalist
might be able to outbid incumbents with a positive probability.
Finally, we show that asymmetries in size across incumbents might reverse the above
identiﬁed overinvestment result and thus, venture capital will have no eﬀect on equilibrium
innovation and development. The reason is that the sales price of the venture-backed ﬁrm
now depends on the valuation of the ﬁrm with the second highest valuation. The venture-
backed ﬁrm will overinvest with respect to that ﬁrm’s private optimal investment, but the
acquirer might prefer a higher (or lower) development level.
This paper can be seen as a contribution to the literature that studies the properties
of the innovation market when innovations can be developed both by incumbents and
5independent parties. One strand of this literature takes its starting point in the advantage
of incumbent-based development relative to independent development being that synergies
with existing incumbent assets can be realized, whereas its disadvantages are that less
powered incentive schemes can be used in the organization. In such an environment,
Amador and Landier (2003) study how the level of potential of the project aﬀects the
pattern of independent and incumbent-based development and Anand, Gatetovic and Stein
(2004) study how the pattern of independent and incumbent-based development is aﬀected
by changes of property rights. Moreover, Gromb and Scarfstein (2002) make use of a labor
market model to determine the equilibrium level of independent and incumbent-based
development. Another strand of this literature studies how product market eﬀects aﬀect
the pattern of independent and incumbent-based development of innovations. Hellmann
(2002) studies how the level of complementarity and substitutability between an innovation
and an oligopolistic incumbent’s assets aﬀects independent and incumbent-based ﬁnancing.
Anton and Yao (1994) study how the competing threats of expropriation by the incumbent
and product market entry by the independent innovator aﬀect the division of surplus from
the innovation, and Gans and Stern (2000, 2003) extend this approach to study how these
forces aﬀect the R&D incentive pattern of incumbents and independent innovators.
We add to the above literature by endogenizing the productivity (size) of the innovation
and allow for competitive bidding among the oligopolistic incumbents over the innovation.
It is then shown that due to the diﬀerence in incentives between the selling independent
developer and the incumbent (the former maximizes the net sales price and the latter
maximizes net proﬁts), the selling independent developer has an incentive to choose a
higher level of productivity of the assets than the incumbent’s optimal choice.
This paper is also related to the literature on patent licensing, where licences are sold
to potential buyers that are competing in a downstream oligopoly market.91 0Most papers
9 For an overview, see Kamien (1992). The paper is also related to the literature on the
persistence of monopoly; see, for instance, Chen (2000) and Gilbert and Newbery (1982).
10 This paper could also be seen as a contribution to the literature on auctions with externalities.
See, for instance, Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000). We
6in this literature treat the size of the innovation as exogenous. To our knowledge, the only
exception is Katz and Shapiro (1986) who determine the optimal licensing fee of a research
lab which can aﬀect the size of the innovation. They ﬁnd that the incentive to develop the
innovation is decreasing in the number of incumbents owning the research lab. We add to
this literature by endogenously determining the ownership of the innovation — before and
after its size (or development) is determined — in situations where agents with diﬀerent
characteristics are potential owners.
Finally, this paper can also be seen as a contribution to the literature on entrepre-
neurship and innovations.11 We extend this literature by constructing a theoretical model
framework where eﬃciency eﬀects of the interaction among entrepreneurs, venture capi-
talists and oligopolist in the innovation process can be analyzed.12
The model is spelled out in Section 2. In Section 3, we explore how the incentives to
develop basic innovations diﬀer between venture-backed and incumbent ﬁrms. In Section
4, we determine the ownership pattern of basic innovations and study the eﬀects of venture
capital on the incentive for basic innovations. In Section 5, we show that venture capital
ﬁnancing may emerge in equilibrium if venture capitalists possess cost advantages, if devel-
opment is associated with moral hazard problems, and if there are coordination problems
among incumbents in the acquisition stage. In Section 6, it is shown that asymmetries
across incumbents have the potential to reverse the above identiﬁed overinvestment result.
In Section 7, empirical implications of the model are discussed. Section 8 concludes the
paper.
add to this literature by endogenizing the productivity of the assets sold in an environment where
this productivity can be aﬀected by an ex ante investment of the seller.
11 For overviews, see Acs and Audretsch (2005) and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005).
12 Baumol (2004) stresses the importance of the diﬀerent roles played by small entrepreneurial
ﬁrms and large established ﬁrms in the innovation process in the US, where small entrepreneurial
ﬁrms create a large share of breakthrough innovations and large established ﬁrms provide more
routinized R&D.
72. The Model
The model is illustrated in Figure 2.1. We consider an oligopoly industry served by a set
I =1 ,2,..,i,...,NI of symmetric ﬁrms. There is also an entrepreneur, denoted E,w h i c hi n
stage zero invests in a research eﬀort e that could lead to the creation of a unique productive
asset, referred to as the basic innovation. If successful, this entrepreneur can sell the basic
innovation to one of the incumbent ﬁrms in stage 1. Alternatively, the entrepreneur can
s e e ks u p p o r tf r o mav e n t u r ec a p i t a l i s tp r o v i d i n ge x p e r t i s ea n dﬁnancial support to develop
the basic innovation. Without this support, the entrepreneur cannot develop her basic
innovation. Consequently, the role played by venture capital is to make it possible for
the entrepreneur to develop her basic innovation into an asset ready for commercialized
use. The entrepreneur may then choose from a set J = {1,2,..,j,..,NJ}. The venture
capitalists compete to provide expertise and ﬁnancial support to the entrepreneur in return
for equity holdings in the ﬁrm. To focus on product market eﬀects as a determinant of the
ownership of the basic innovation, we model the sale of the basic innovation as a ﬁrst-price
perfect information auction with incumbent ﬁrms and venture capitalists bidding for the
innovation.
If the entrepreneur obtains ﬁnancing and support from a venture capitalist j in stage
1, the venture-backed ﬁrm can, in stage 2, invest kVj in the development of the basic inno-
vation, thereby creating a developed innovation where further development will increase
the possessor’s proﬁt, but decrease the proﬁts of the rival incumbent ﬁrms in the ensuing
product market. Note that ex-ante symmetry implies kVj = kV. If, on the other hand,
an incumbent ﬁrm i obtains the innovation in stage 1, the acquiring ﬁrm invests kAi in
development in stage 2 where once more, ex-ante symmetry implies kAi = kA. In stage 3,
upon development, the venture-backed ﬁrm j exits by selling the developed innovation at
a ﬁrst-price perfect information auction, where the NI incumbent ﬁrms are the potential
buyers of the developed innovation.13 Finally, in stage 4, the incumbent ﬁrms compete in
13It is shown in Norbäck and Persson (2006) that the acquiring ﬁrm will never invest sequentially in
8oligopoly interaction, setting an action xi.
3. Venture capitalists and the incentives to develop innovations
3.1. Stage 4: Product-market equilibrium
Using backward induction, we start with the product market interaction, where ﬁrm i
chooses an action xi ∈ R+ to maximize its direct product market proﬁt, Πi(xi,x−i,k),
which depends on its own and its rivals’ market actions, xi and x−i (which is the (NI −
1) × 1 vector of actions taken by rival incumbent ﬁrms), as well as the total amount of
development previously undertaken (by the acquiring incumbent or the venture-backed
ﬁrm) k, where we omit the subindex in order to avoid heavy notation. We may consider
the action xi as setting a quantity or a price, as will be shown in later sections. We assume










−i is the actions by ﬁrm i:s rivals.
Using the ex-ante symmetry among incumbent ﬁrms, we only need to distinguish be-
tween two ﬁrm types, i.e. the acquiring ﬁrm (denoted A) and the non-acquiring ﬁrms
(denoted NA). The actions are then simply xA = xAi and xNA = x−NAi,w h e r exNA is one
of the (NI −1)×1 arguments in vector xNA of symmetric actions taken by non-acquiring
incumbent ﬁrms. Since the optimal actions for the acquirer (x∗
A)a n dt h en o n - a c q u i r e r s
(x∗
NA), respectively, only depend on k,w ec a nd e ﬁne the reduced-form product market











14 To save space, we write the arguments in RNA(k) ≡ ΠNA(x∗
NA(k),x ∗
A (k)) with a slight
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Figure 2.1: The structure of the game.
10We shall assume the reduced-form product market proﬁtf o raﬁrm of type h = {A,NA},








Assumption 1 states that the reduced-form product market proﬁtf o rt h ea c q u i r e ri s
strictly increasing in investments for development in the innovation, whereas such invest-
ments strictly decrease the rivals’ proﬁts. To keep the exposition simple, we use the deriv-




∂k , keeping in
mind that these summarize the total eﬀects on the product-market proﬁts.15
3.2. Stage 3: Sale of the developed innovation by the venture-backed ﬁrm
We model the acquisition process in stage 3 as a perfect information auction where the
NI incumbent ﬁrms simultaneously post bids, which are then accepted or rejected by the
venture capitalist. Each incumbent ﬁrm announces a bid, bi, for the developed innovation,
where b =( b1,...,bi,...bNI) ∈ RNI is the vector of these bids. Following the announcement
of b, the developed innovation may be sold to one of the incumbents at the bid price, or
remain in the ownership of the venture-backed ﬁrm.16 The equilibrium acquisition price
is denoted by SD∗.
We now turn to incumbent ﬁrms’ valuations of obtaining the developed innovation wII,
deﬁned in (3.3), where the ﬁrst letter in the subscript refers to an incumbent buyer and
the second letter to the alternative buyer being another incumbent. The ﬁrst term shows
the proﬁtf o ra ni n c u m b e n tﬁrm when possessing the innovation, the second term shows
the proﬁt if it is obtained by a rival incumbent ﬁrm:
wII = RA(k) − RNA(k). (3.3)
15 Assumption 1 holds in the Linear-Quadratic Cournot model which is presented below, but
it is also compatible with other oligopoly models: Farrell and Shapiro (1996).
16 If more than one of the incumbent ﬁrms make such a bid, each such ﬁrm obtains the
assets with equal probability. The acquisition is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure
strategies. There is a smallest amount, ε, chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if ε is
added or subtracted.
11Note that since incumbent ﬁrms are symmetric ex-ante, their valuations are symmetric.
It is then straightforward to derive the following lemma17:
Lemma 1. I ns t a g e3 ,t h ed e v e l o p e di n n o v a t i o ni sa c q u i r e db ya ni n c u m b e n tﬁrm, at a
price, SD, equal to a rival incumbent ﬁrm’s valuation of the developed innovation, i.e.
SD∗ = wII.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
3.3. Stage 2: Development of the basic innovation
In subsection 3.3.1, we determine the optimal level of development when an incumbent
develops the basic innovation, whereas Section 3.3.2 determines the optimal level of de-
velopment when the venture backed ﬁrm develops the basic innovation.
3.3.1. The acquiring incumbent’s optimal development
Assume that the acquirer faces a strictly convex investment cost function, C(k),s u c h
that C0(k) > 0 and C00(k) > 0. Then, the maximization problem facing the acquiring
incumbent ﬁrm can be written as follows:
Max:
{k}
RA(k) − C(k), (3.4)
where C(k)=
R k
0 C0(k)dk is the total cost of investing k in development and C0(k) is the
associated marginal cost.
We assume RA(k)−C(k) to be strictly concave in k. The optimal choice by the acquiring
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(i) Investing in 
development of the 

















Figure 3.1: Investment incentives and the valuations for basic innovations.
133.3.2. The venture backed ﬁrm’s optimal development
The venture-backed ﬁrm invests in the development of the basic innovation maximizing
the net sales price of a developed innovation, i.e., SD(k)−C(k). We assume the venture-
backed ﬁrm and the incumbent ﬁrms to face the same variable investment cost function





















where we assume that RA(k) − RNA(k) − C(k) is strictly concave in k.T h e o p t i m a l k
is indicated as k∗
V in Figure 3.1(i). Comparing expressions (3.5) and (3.7), we see that
the venture capitalist has stronger incentives to invest in development than the acquiring
ﬁrm, since the venture capitalist achieves a higher acquisition price by not only taking into
account the increase in proﬁts for the acquirer
dRA
dk , but also by exploiting the negative
externalities on the non-acquirer, captured by the last term
dRNA
dk , which is negative from
Assumption 1.
Thereby, we have derived the following result:
Proposition 1. The optimal level of development by a venture-backed ﬁrm which sells
the developed innovation to an incumbent ﬁrm, exceeds the optimal level of development




Thus, proposition 1 shows that a venture capitalist has a stronger incentive to develop
an innovation than an incumbent ﬁrm, since it exploits the negative eﬀect of development
on the non-acquiring ﬁrm’s proﬁt through the higher acquisition price.
144. The equilibrium ownership of basic innovations and the entre-
preneurs’ incentives to innovate
We now turn to the equilibrium ownership of basic innovations and the entrepreneurs’
incentives to innovate. To this end, we assume that the entrepreneur sells the basic
innovation to the highest bidder at an auction in stage 1. We apply the same acquisition
process as in section 3.2 and refer to the description of the game provided in that section. In
the auction, incumbent ﬁrms’ bids are interpreted as direct payments for a full acquisition,
while venture capitalists’ bids are interpreted as oﬀers of ﬁnancing and support, in return
for a stake in the proceeds of the sale of the developed innovation in stage 3.
4.1. Stage 1: The equilibrium ownership of basic innovations
To distinguish stage 1 valuations from stage 3 valuations w,w ed e n o t et h ef o r m e rb yv.
We now derive and rank these stage 1 valuations to solve for the equilibrium ownership
and acquisition price for the basic innovation.
First, the valuation vII is the value for an incumbent ﬁrm of acquiring the basic inno-








Thus, vII is the diﬀerence in the net proﬁt RA(k)−C(k) of the acquirer and the proﬁto f
the non-acquirer RNA(k), evaluated at the acquiring incumbent’s optimal development, k∗
A
from (3.5). vII is given as the vertical distance between points A and N in Figure 3.1(ii).
Second, a venture capitalist’s stage 1 valuation of the basic innovation, denoted vV,
is the sales price of the developed innovation in stage 3, net the investment costs. From
Lemma 1, we have SD∗ = wII(k∗
V)=RA(k∗
V)−RNA(k∗
V) and thus, the venture capitalist’s













15Since a venture capitalist maximizes the net value of incumbent ﬁrms’ valuations of the
innovation RA(k)−C(k)−RNA(k), the valuation of a venture capitalist must exceed that
of an incumbent ﬁrm, when it considers that a rival incumbent would otherwise obtain
the innovation, vV >v II. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1(ii), where vV is shown as the
vertical distance between V and V’.
Third, if a venture capitalist does obtain the basic innovation, it will be more aggres-
sively developed, k∗
V >k ∗
A. This implies that the proﬁt for an incumbent ﬁrm of not
obtaining the innovation under a venture ownership of the basic innovation, RNA(k∗
V), will
be lower than from the corresponding one when a rival incumbent owns the basic innova-
tion, RNA(k∗
A). Therefore, there is a third valuation to consider, vIV,w h i c hi st h ev a l u e
for an incumbent ﬁrm of obtaining the innovation when it would otherwise be obtained








The valuation vIV is also shown in Figure 3.1(ii). As illustrated by the ﬁgure, an incumbent
is willing to pay more than a venture capitalist to obtain the innovation, in order to avoid an





V)] > 0 since k∗
A <k ∗
V maximizes the acquiring incumbent’s net
proﬁts RA(k) − C(k).
Thus, we have established the following ranking of valuations:
vIV >v V >v II. (4.4)
Using (4.4) we can derive the equilibrium ownership of the basic innovation:18
Proposition 2. In stage 1, the basic innovation is acquired by an incumbent ﬁrm at a
price equal to a venture capitalist’s valuation, SB∗ = vV.
18Norbäck and Persson (2006) provide a detailed proof. Note that there exist many such asymmetric
equilibria, i.e. as many as there are incumbents.
16The unique Nash equilibrium is that where one of the incumbents acquires the basic
innovation at a price SB∗ = vV. To see why, ﬁrst note that bidding competition among
the symmetric venture capitalists implies that the equilibrium price cannot be lower than
SB = vV. No venture capitalist has an incentive to bid higher. Therefore, let us consider
the equilibrium candidate where one incumbent bids vV and the second highest bid is
made by a venture capitalist who bids vv − ε.
The acquiring incumbent will not deviate to a lower bid. To see why, compare the
acquiring incumbent’s product market proﬁt net of development costs and acquisition
price in an acquisition in stage 1, π1
A = RA(k∗
A) − C(k∗
A) − vV,t ot h en e tp r o ﬁtt h i s
ﬁrm would obtain from an acquisition of venture developed innovation in stage 3, π3
A =
RA(k∗
V) − SD∗ = RNA(k∗

































= vIV − vV > 0.
The ﬁrst line in (4.5) shows that an incumbent always ”pays” for a developed innovation
— either in a direct acquisition of the basic innovation outbidding the venture capital-
ists in stage 1, or in the bidding competition with rivals over a developed innovation
in stage 3. The second and third line in (4.5) then reveal that the beneﬁtf r o mad i -
rect acquisition comes from avoiding the excessive investments by a venture capitalist
which would otherwise occur under a late acquisition. Finally, other incumbents will
not challenge an acquisition by a rival ﬁrm since they beneﬁtf r o mw e a k e rm a r k e tc o m -




A) − vII >R A(k∗
A) − C(k∗
A) − vV = π1
A holds from (4.4).
The basic innovation is thus acquired by an incumbent ﬁrm investing k∗
A in develop-
ment, thereby inducing an acquisition price SB∗ = vV. Thus, incumbents acquire basic
innovations to preempt, for them, excessive investments in development that would oth-
erwise be undertaken by venture-backed ﬁrms.
174.2. Stage 0: Equilibrium innovation by the entrepreneur
In stage 0, entrepreneur E undertakes eﬀort e to discover an innovation. Assume that the
probability of succeeding with an innovation is the eﬀort, i.e. e ∈ [0,1],a n dt h a te can
be privately chosen by the entrepreneur at an increasing and convex cost y(e), y0(e) > 0,
and y00(e) > 0. πE = eSB∗ − y(e) is then the expected net proﬁt of undertaking eﬀort for
the entrepreneur, where SB∗ is the acquisition price obtained in the auction for the basic








∗)=0 ,( 4 . 6 )
with the associated second-order condition,
d2πE
de2 = −y00(e) < 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem in (4.6), we can state the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. The equilibrium eﬀort by the entrepreneur in stage 0, e∗ and hence, the prob-
ability of a successful innovation, increase in the acquisition price obtained in stage 1, SB∗,
i.e. de∗
dSB∗ > 0.
As shown, preemptive acquisitions by incumbents occur in stage 1 to preempt such, for
them, excessive investments in development by venture capitalists. However, to obtain the
entrepreneur’s innovation, the acquiring incumbent ﬁrm must at least pay the entrepreneur
a price for the innovation matching the venture-backed ﬁrm’s valuation vV,w h i c hf r o m
Proposition 2 exceeds the prevailing price if only incumbents bid vII. Then, using Lemma
2, we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. The presence of venture capitalists increases the acquisition price for ba-
sic innovations also in situations where venture capitalists do not acquire basic innovations.
Thus, the presence of venture capitalists increases the rents appropriated by entrepreneurs,
and thereby the incentive to innovate.
185. Venture capitalists in equilibrium
The previous section shows that the development of basic innovations will not be ﬁnanced
by venture capitalists in equilibrium. In this section, we will show that venture capitalist-
backed development of basic innovations can emerge in equilibrium when: (i) venture
capitalists possess cost advantages, (ii) development of the innovation is associated with
moral hazard problems, and (iii) there are coordination problems among incumbents in
the bidding over the basic innovation.
5.1. Cost diﬀerences between venture capitalists and incumbents
Empirical research on venture capitalists suggests that they possess unique assets in terms
of informational advantages, monitoring and control abilities. For instance, Hellmann and
Puri (2002) ﬁnd evidence of US venture capital being related to a variety of profession-
alizing measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock options plans,
and the hiring of a marketing VP. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2004) ﬁnd similar evi-
dence for European venture capital. Yet, in other situations, incumbent ﬁrms will possess
advantages due to their larger scale and accumulated knowledge.
We capture such eﬃciency diﬀerences in a simple way by assuming venture capitalists
and incumbents to diﬀer in ﬁxed costs Fh associated with development, while keeping
the assumption that variable costs C(k) are symmetric. Adding ﬁxed development costs,
the valuations in (4.1)-(4.3) change to vII = RA(k∗
A) − C(k∗





V)−FV and vIV = RA(k∗
A)−C(k∗
A)−FI −RNA(k∗
V),w h e r et h e
optimal investments in (3.5) and (3.7) remain unchanged.19
T os o l v ef o rt h ee q u i l i b r i u mﬁnancing of the entrepreneur’s basic innovation, we can
proceed as in Section 4.1. Adding ﬁxed development costs to (4.5), the diﬀerence in proﬁts













V) − FV]. (5.1)
19Note that these ﬁxed cost are taken after the bidding competition has taken place.
19The ”auction mechanism” will once more select the ownership and the subsequent devel-
opment of the entrepreneur’s basic innovation that maximize the acquiring incumbent’s
net proﬁt. In (4.5), we noted that incumbent ownership emerges due to overinvestment
by venture capitalists. In (5.1), lower development costs for venture capitalists FV <F I
can compensate for the lower net proﬁt from overinvestment and venture ﬁnancing can
then emerge in equilibrium. Deﬁne the ﬁxed cost diﬀerence D = FI −FV and assume that
there exists a ¯ D = ¯ FI − ¯ FV > 0 which fulﬁlls π1
A −π3
A =0 . Then, if the development cost
were to decrease further for the venture capitalist, the venture capitalist would ﬁnance the
development of the basic innovation in equilibrium.
We can thus state the following result:
Proposition 4. To be active in equilibrium, venture capitalists must face a suﬃciently
lower ﬁxed cost than incumbent ﬁrms in developing basic innovations.
We can also use this set-up to study the impact of the cost eﬃciency level of the
venture capital industry on the equilibrium innovation and development levels. To this
end, consider a situation where no venture capital is present, and only incumbents are
suﬃciently eﬃcient to acquire innovations. Consequently, an incumbent will acquire the
b a s i ci n n o v a t i o na tp r i c eSB = vII, investing k∗
A in development. Then, assume that a
suﬃciently eﬃc i e n tv e n t u r ec a p i t a lm a r k e te m e r g e s . T h i si m p l i e st h a tw em o v et ot h e
equilibrium where a venture capitalist will acquire the basic innovation at price SB = vV,
investing k∗
V in development. It then follows that the emergence of a venture capital
market does not only generate a higher acquisition price for basic innovations, vV >v II,
stimulating more innovations, it also induces better developed innovations, since k∗
V >k ∗
A.
On a ﬁnal note, it has been acknowledged in the literature that entrepreneurs often
put a high value on controlling the development of their initial innovation, and that the
entrepreneurs’ control rights would be larger when ﬁnanced by a venture capitalist, than
when acquired by an incumbent. This would then imply that the entrepreneur could seek
support from the venture capitalist, even though the incumbent is willing to pay more in
20monetary terms.
5.2. Simultaneous investment
So far, we have assumed all investments in development to be performed by the venture
capitalist or the incumbent ﬁrm. However, in practice, also the entrepreneur would often
need to invest in development. As shown in recent work on venture capital, this can lead
to under-investments due to a double moral hazard problem.20
To incorporate these features into our framework, we introduce simultaneous invest-
ments in stage 2 of the game. Let Kl = kl +kEl then be the total amount of development.
Thus, if a venture-backed ﬁrm is formed (l = V ), the entrepreneur and the venture capi-
talist simultaneously supply non-contractible investments, kEV and kV, into development.
Analogously, if the development takes place within the incumbent ﬁrm (l = A), the en-
trepreneur and the acquirer simultaneously supply non-contractible investments, kEA and
kA. Moreover, all agents are assumed to face the same investment cost function C(k).I n
stage 1, we assume that venture capitalists and incumbents make bids in terms of simple
equity-ﬁnance contracts {αl,B l} for l = V,A. αl ∈ [0,1] speciﬁes the equity share of
the proceeds to the venture capitalist or the acquiring incumbent of the joint venture,
respectively, and Bl is the price for this equity share. Other parts of the game remain
unchanged.
5.2.1. Stage 4: Product-market equilibrium
Let Πh(xh,x−h,K) denote the direct product market proﬁt of an incumbent ﬁrm of type
h = A,NA.T h eo p t i m a lm a r k e ta c t i o n sx∗ are not aﬀected by the equity contract other
than through its impact on total development, K. Reduced-form product market prof-
its are then RA(K) ≡ ΠA(x∗
A (K),x∗
NA(K),K) and RNA(K) ≡ ΠNA(x∗
NA(K),x ∗
A (K)),
where Assumption 1 holds in total development K,i . e .
dRA
dK > 0 and
dRNA
dK < 0.
20See Casamatta (2004), Hellmann (2006), Inderst and Mueller (2004), Repullo and Suarez (2004) and
Schmidt (2003).
215.2.2. Stage 3: Sale of the developed innovation by the venture-backed ﬁrm
The incumbent ﬁrms’ valuations of obtaining a developed innovation from a venture capi-
talist are wII = RA(K)−RNA(K), which is the price paid by an incumbent in equilibrium,
i.e. SD∗ = wII.
5.2.3. Stage 2: Development of the basic innovation
Let us now determine the optimal development of a basic innovation for a given equity
contract, {α,B}. Start with the case with incumbent ﬁnancing. Assuming the incumbent’s
net proﬁt αRA(KA)−C(kA) to be strictly concave in kA, and the entrepreneur’s net proﬁt

















Likewise, assuming that the venture capitalist’s net sales price α[RA(KV)−RNA(KV)]−
C(kA) is strictly concave in kV and that the entrepreneur’s net sales price (1 − α)[RA(KV)−

























For a given equity contract, (5.2) and (5.3) imply an incentive for strategic overinvest-







Yet again, this occurs since the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist achieve a higher
acquisition price by not only taking into account the increase in proﬁts for the acquirer,
but also by exploiting the negative externalities on the non-acquirer. We now turn to the
equilibrium equity contract.
225.2.4. Stage 1: The equilibrium ownership of basic innovations
Let us ﬁrst derive the equity contract oﬀered by a venture capitalist, (α∗
V,B V(α∗
V)).T h e
bidding competition among venture capitalists implies that a venture capitalist will oﬀer
the equity price BV(α)=αSD∗(K∗
V(α)) − C(k∗









.T h i sc o n t r a c t(α∗
V,B V(α∗
V)) will then
maximize the gain of the entrepreneur (1 − α)SD∗(K∗
V(α))−C(k∗
EV(α))+BV(α),l e a v i n g
the venture capitalist at a zero gain.
Let us then turn to the equity contract oﬀered by an incumbent, (α∗
A,B A(α∗
A)).F o ra















E0s gain from accepting the VC contract






E0s net proﬁt under incumbent ﬁnancing
.
(5.4)
The price of equity BA(α) leaves the entrepreneur (E)i n d i ﬀerent between the contract
oﬀered by a venture capitalist and the incumbent’s contract. The incumbent will then oﬀer
the equity contract (α∗
A,B A(α∗
A)), where the optimal equity share maximizes her gain, i.e.
α∗
A =a r gm a x α{αRA(K∗
A(α)) − C(k∗
A(α)) − BA(α)},w h e r eBA(α) is given from (5.4).
We can now proceed as in Section 4.1 to determine the equilibrium ownership of the













be the net proﬁto ft h i sﬁrm under a late acquisition of a developed innovation in stage
3. Using (5.4), an incumbent’s incentive for a direct preemptive acquisition of the basic








































































23In (5.5), we note that the term SD∗(α∗
V)) a p p e a r sb o t hi nt h es e c o n da n dt h i r dl i n e .
Thus, an incumbent will pay for a developed innovation regardless of when the acquisition
takes place. From (5.6), this implies that the incentive for an early preemptive acquisition
is, yet again, given by the diﬀerence in the product market proﬁt of the acquiring incum-





V), respectively.21 We can then state the following result,
w h i c hi sp r o v e nb e l o w .
Proposition 5. When investments into development cannot be contracted, the develop-
ment of the basic innovation may be ﬁnanced by venture capital in equilibrium
To see why venture capital may ﬁnance development in this setting, it is useful to ﬁrst


















,( 5 . 7 )
where we note that since the incumbent and the entrepreneur face identical strictly convex





W ec a nt h e nc o m p a r et h eb e n c h m a r kﬁrst-best investments K
opt
A to the investments in














It is straightforward to show that regardless of the source of ﬁnancing of the basic
innovation, the optimal equity share involves an equal split for the parties, i.e. α∗ =
α∗
A = α∗









A . That is, under
the equity contract, (5.2) implies an under-investment problem since the entrepreneur and























V )) < 0 then follows since α∗










24the incumbent only take into account their share of the increase in proﬁts when investing,
while ignoring the positive eﬀect on the collaborator in the ﬁrm.
From (5.2) and (5.3), it also follows that K∗
V(α∗) >K ∗
A(α∗). That is, aggregate invest-
ments in the venture-backed ﬁrm will be larger than in the incumbent ﬁrm. The reason is
yet again that the venture backed ﬁrm maximizes the sales price of a developed innovation.
But then, the more aggressive investments under venture ﬁnancing K∗
V(α∗) >K ∗
A(α∗) can








Whether incumbent- or venture-ﬁnanced development of the basic innovation will occur
in equilibrium will depend on the details of the model. To show that double moral hazard
problems can induce venture capital ﬁnancing in equilibrium, we apply an example.
The Linear-Quadratic Cournot model (LQC) Product market competition in stage
4 is a Cournot-duopoly in homogeneous goods with linear demand, P = a −
Q
s ,w h e r ea
indicates consumer willingness to pay and s denotes market size. Direct product market
proﬁts are Πh =( P −ch)xh ,w h e r exh is output for a ﬁrm of type h = {A,NA}.T h em a r -
ginal cost of the acquirer is cA = c−[kA + kEA] under direct acquisition by an incumbent,
and cA = c−[kV + kEV] when development is undertaken by the venture-backed ﬁrm. The
non-acquirer is assumed to have the marginal cost cNA = c. Reduced-form proﬁts in (3.2)
then take the form Rh = 1
s (q∗
h)
2,w h e r eq∗
h = s
a−2ch+c−h
3 . The total investment cost for







where μ>0 is a cost parameter such that (omitting subindex) C0(k)=μk and C00(k)=μ.
We can then derive the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In the LQC model with simultaneous investments: (i) α∗
A = α∗
V =1 /2, (ii)
a venture capitalist will ﬁnance the development of the entrepreneur’s basic innovation


















25Proof. See the Appendix.
Consequently, we have shown that incumbents may abstain from early preemptive ac-
quisitions of basic innovations if they face double moral hazard problems in investments,
since venture-backed ﬁrms’ overinvestment brings investments closer to the acquirer’s ﬁrst-
best investments. In Norbäck and Persson (2006), it is also shown that when eﬃciency dif-
ferences between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist (incumbent) are introduced,
the equity contract will award the more eﬃcient party a larger share of the proceeds of
the venture. This will limit the double moral hazard problem and preemptive acquisitions
by incumbent ﬁrms will then dominate in equilibrium as in Section 4.
5.3. Coordination failures among incumbents
We now turn to a third mechanism through which venture capital can be active in equi-
librium. We use the benchmark model of Section 4 to spell out the argument. From the
proof of Proposition 2, it follows that the gains of a direct preemptive acquisition of the
basic innovation in stage 1 are unevenly distributed among incumbents. The acquiring








Since non-acquiring incumbents gain more from a direct acquisition than the acquiring
incumbent, a coordination failure between incumbents can emerge. Venture capitalists
might then be able to outbid the incumbents acquiring the basic innovation, even though
vIV >v V. This can be shown by extending the auction in stage 1 by allowing for mixed
strategy equilibria. In such a mixed strategy equilibrium, incumbents can play vV with a
certain probability ρ∗ and abstain from bidding with a certain probability 1−ρ∗,w h e r e a s
venture capitalists play vV −ε with certainty. There are two types of outcomes. In the ﬁrst,
at least one of the incumbents is drawn to make a bid vV and thus, a direct preemptive
acquisition takes place. In the second, all incumbents’ bids are drawn as no bidding. In
this case, one of the venture capitalists obtains the innovation at price vV − ε.
26Consequently, the coordination failure could be another explanation why venture-
backed ﬁrms appear in equilibrium, despite the fact that the incumbents would like to
preempt venture ﬁnancing.
6. Underinvestment in venture-backed ﬁrms with asymmetric in-
cumbents
We have shown that venture capitalists will overinvest in development in order to extract
a high sales price for developed innovations. In this extension, we show that venture
capitalists may not overinvest when incumbents are suﬃciently asymmetric. The reason
is that the sales price of the venture-backed ﬁrm now depends on the valuation of the ﬁrm
with the second highest valuation.
To see why, consider once more the LQC model and assume that the industry contains
a low cost incumbent (L) and a high cost incumbent (H). Let i,j = {L,H} denote the
ﬁrm index. The reduced-form proﬁts for ﬁrm i when ﬁrm j has obtained the developed





¢2,w h e r eq∗
ij = s
a−2cij+c−ij
3 .L e t cij =¯ ci for i 6= j and cii =
¯ ci − θik be the marginal cost for i when not possessing the innovation and possessing the
innovation, respectively. To capture ex-ante diﬀerences, we assume that ¯ cL < ¯ cH.E x p l i c i t
expressions for q∗
ij are given in (A.5) in the Appendix, where we also give the proofs for
the statements below.
Note that ﬁrm i’s valuation in stage 3 for a developed innovation in (3.3) is wij =



































If the low cost and the high cost ﬁrm are equally eﬃcient in using the developed
innovation, θL = θH = θ,t h el o wc o s tﬁrm will have a higher valuation, wLH >w HL.
To see this, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h ei n c r e a s ei np r o ﬁt induced from developing the innovation
27aﬀects more units in the low cost (larger) ﬁrm when this ﬁrm obtains the innovation,
q∗
LL >q ∗
HH. At the same time, the loss in proﬁt as a non-acquirer is more severe for the







dk will hold for a positive development level k.S i n c e , b y d e ﬁnition,
wLH = wHL =0at k =0 ,w eh a v ewLH >w HL for k>0.
We can now discuss overinvestment in this setting. Applying Lemma 1, the acquisition
price in stage 1 will be SB∗ = wHL. A venture capitalist will therefore invest to maximize
the net valuation of the high-cost ﬁrm, k∗
V =a r gm a x k{RHH(k) − RHL(k) − C(k)},w h i l e
the optimal investment under a direct acquisition by the low cost ﬁrm maximizes this
ﬁrm’s net proﬁt, k∗
A =a r g m a x k{RLL(k) − C(k)}. I tf o l l o w st h a tt h ed i ﬀerence in the

















In the Appendix, we show that if the ex-ante diﬀerence in marginal costs ¯ cS − ¯ cL > 0
of the two ﬁr m si ss u ﬃciently large, R0
LL − (R0
HH − R0
HL) > 0 holds in (6.3) and the
investment made under a direct acquisition by the low-cost incumbent will be larger than
the investment made by the venture capitalist, k∗
A >k ∗
V.T h el a r g el o w - c o s tﬁrm then has
a stronger incentive to invest to maximize proﬁts, since a given proﬁti n c r e a s ea ﬀects more
units, q∗
LL >q ∗
HH. A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h en e g a t i v ee x t e r n a l i t yo nt h eh i g hc o s tﬁrm, which
is driving the over-investment eﬀect under venture ﬁnancing, is limited due to the high
cost of the small size ﬁrm, q∗
HL. Even though the venture capitalist will be maximizing the
small ﬁrm’s valuation, driving investments beyond what is required for proﬁt maximization
in this ﬁrm, the investment may still be smaller than the proﬁt maximizing investment
choice of the large ﬁrm.
7. Empirical implications
Kortum and Lerner (2000) ﬁnd that the presence of venture capitalists signiﬁcantly in-
creases the patenting rates in US-industries, noting that while the size of venture capital
28is less than 3 % of corporate R&D outlays, venture capital accounts for about 8 % of the
industrial innovations. Our model predicts such an eﬃciency eﬀect of venture capital.22
First, venture capitalists develop innovations more aggressively, since the sales price
of an innovation — rather than the product market proﬁt — is maximized. Second, since
part of the increase in the sales price is generated by exploiting the negative externalities
on non-acquiring incumbents, venture capitalists also need to be more eﬃcient to exist in
equilibrium.
Let us now discuss some additional testable implications of the model. One way of
testing the over-investment eﬀect would be to directly compare ﬁrm level data on devel-
opment k∗
V and k∗
A (or the associated costs C(k∗
V) and C(k∗
A)) for innovations held by
venture-backed ﬁrms and incumbent ﬁrms, respectively. The overinvestment should then
be identiﬁed in concentrated markets where incumbents are not too asymmetric.
Due to the problem of measurement and availability of detailed data, an alternative
method would be to use stockmarket data to indirectly test the over-investment eﬀect.
The stock market predictions will, of course, be sensitive to how and when the information
about the progress and potential of the venture reaches the stockmarket. Keeping this in
mind, assume that the stock market is eﬃcient and values ﬁrms according to their expected
proﬁts. Moreover, assume that the innovation and development process proceeds as in the
game in Figure 2.1. To highlight the eﬀect of the emergence of venture-backed ﬁrms, then
assume that the outcome of the acquisition game in stage 1 will come as partial surprise
for the stock market. This may be due other costs associated with the development of
the basic innovation stage 1 which are not perfectly known, or that coordination problems
arise between incumbents in preempting venture capitalists.
Under these assumptions, the model would predict that the stockmarket value of in-
cumbents would decrease around the announcement of the signing of a contract between
22As stated in the introduction, there are other possible explanations for this empirical result based
on information problems, including a sample selection bias associated with ﬁrms’ self-selection or the
screening role of venture capitalists.
29an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist for an important venture early in its development
process. This would be due to the fact that the stockmarket then foresees a more aggres-
sive development of the innovation than previously expected, which will hurt incumbents
in the subsequent acquisition process and product market interaction.
Moreover, if an incumbent acquisition occurs, and the identity of the buyer comes as a
partial surprise for the stock market, a second prediction would be that the stockmarket
value of the non-acquiring incumbents would increase around the time of the announce-
ment, relative to the acquiring incumbent’s stock market value, since outsiders free ride on
the acquisition. However, the announcement of an incumbent acquisition of an innovation
already extensively developed with venture capital should not aﬀect stockmarket values,
since the information on overinvestment is already capitalized in the market.
8. Conclusions
T h ee x i to fv e n t u r e - b a c k e dﬁrms often takes place through a sale to an incumbent oligopolis-
tic ﬁr m . W es h o wt h a ti ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n t ,v e n t u r e - b a c k e dﬁrms have a stronger
incentive to develop basic innovations into commercialized innovations than incumbent
ﬁrms, due to strategic product market eﬀects on the sales price of the venture-backed
ﬁrm. In turn, this will increase the price for basic innovations, thereby triggering more
basic innovations by entrepreneurs.
Empirical research on venture capitalists suggests that they possess unique assets in
terms of informational advantages, monitoring and control abilities and thereby, they are
more eﬃcient than incumbent ﬁrms in bringing commercialized innovations to the mar-
ket. However, it might then be believed that less skilled venture capitalists would enter
t h em a r k e ta n dr e d u c et h i sd i ﬀerence in eﬃciency. Our model provides an explanation
for why this might not necessarily be the case. The reason is that when innovations are
used in oligopolistic markets, venture-backed ﬁrms will produce more development than
incumbents due to strategic product market eﬀects. This implies that to exist in equilib-
30rium, venture capitalists must be substantially more eﬃcient than incumbents, otherwise
incumbents will preempt venture capitalists by acquiring basic innovations.
Our results thus provide additional support for the policy view that a well-functioning
venture capital market will increase the innovative activity in a country.23 Moreover,
o u rr e s u l t si n d i c a t et h a tt h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h ep r e s e n c eo fav e n t u r ec a p i t a lm a r k e tf o r
innovation activity may be underestimated in empirical work. To see this, note that the
presence of venture capitalists as potential independent developers, even if they do not
develop innovations in equilibrium, still increases the reward and hence, the incentives for
entrepreneurial innovations,
In the analysis, we have assumed that the seller of the innovation uses a ﬁrst-price
sealed bid auction. We believe that this auction set-up captures essential features of the
bidding competition over a scarce asset in situations where acquisitions are used to gain
access to innovations, which are indeed frequently used in practice. But this implies that
some possibilities for creating additional rents are potentially neglected. More generally,
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchettis (1999) show that sophisticated mechanisms are needed
to maximize revenues in auctions with externalities where, for instance, it might be the
case that all ﬁrms in the market need to provide transfers to the seller. However, as
pointed out by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000), a problem with these mechanisms is that
the seller needs an unrealistically strong commitment power and thus, they are often not
feasible.24 Nevertheless, if more sophisticated selling mechanisms were to allocate a larger
23 See, for instance, OECD (1999) and European Commission (1999).
24 One potentially feasible strategy which makes it possible for the entrepreneur to extract
more rents is to sell the basic innovation, threatening to aggressively develop the innovation. In
terms of the benchmark model in Section 5, an incumbent ﬁrm would be willing to pay vIV,
which would give the entrepreneur larger proceeds as compared to the case when it sells directly,
since SB∗
= vV <v IV. One way of achieving this would be through stating a reservation price
at vIV. But this will create problems unless the entrepreneur can develop the innovation herself.
T os e et h i s ,i ft h er e s e r v a t i o np r i c ei svIV >v V , venture capitalists might not want to participate
in the auction and the threat of over development might not be credible. Thus, the maximum
willingness to pay for incumbents would then be vII and the entrepreneur would then be forced
to charge a lower reservation price than vIV.
31share of the surplus to the entrepreneur, the existence of a venture capital market would
trigger even more basic innovations. The additional payment would also be higher in cases
where the entrepreneur could develop the innovation herself.
A. Appendix:
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
First, consider the equilibrium candidate where incumbent iw acquires the innovation,
denoted b∗. Note that b∗
iw >w II − ε is a weakly dominated strategy, since no owner will
post a bid over its maximum valuation of obtaining the innovation. If b∗
iw <w II − ε, ﬁrm
is beneﬁts from deviating to b∗∗
is = b∗
iw + ε, since it then obtains the innovation and pays
a price lower than its valuation of obtaining it. Last, consider candidate b∗
iw = wII − ε,
b∗
is = wII−2ε. Then, no owner has an incentive to deviate. T h u s ,t h i si saN a s he q u i l i b r i u m
and the only NE where ﬁrm iw obtains the assets.
Second, note that the situation where no incumbent obtains the innovation cannot
occur if there is no reservation price at the auction.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3







where it can be shown that 9μ − 16 > 0 needs to be fulﬁl l e di no r d e rt oh a v eau n i q u e
solution to (5.7). That is, for 9μ − 16 > 0 the Hessian to RA(Kh) − C(kh) − C(kEh) is
negative deﬁnite. Formally, we make the assumption:
Assumption A1: 9μ − 16 > 0.








EA(α)=4( 1− α) Λ
9μ−8 (A.2)
32where Λ = a − c. From Assumption A1, it is straightforward to show that (A.2) is a
unique, stable Nash-equilibrium.






EV(α)=2( 1− α) Λ
3μ−2. (A.3)
Once more, from Assumption A1, it is straightforward to show that (A.3) is a unique,
stable Nash-equilibrium.
Part (i): The optimal equity share Using (A.2), straightforward calculations then
show that α∗
A =a r gm a x α{αRA(K∗
A(α)) − C(k∗
A(α)) − BA(α)} =1 /2. Furthermore, from
(A.3) direct calculations give α∗








1/2. The SOC for the optimal equity contract for the incumbent α∗
A is −32μ Λ2
(9μ−8)2 <
0, whereas the SOC for the optimal equity contract for the venture capitalist α∗
V is
−8μ Λ2
(3μ−2)2 < 0.T h u s , α∗
A = α∗
V =1 /2 are unique. In the remainder of the proof,
we use the short-hand α∗ = α∗
A = α∗
V =1 /2.
Part (ii): Ownership of the basic innovation From (5.6), preemptive acquisi-
tions of the basic innovation by an incumbent occur iﬀ π1
A − π3




A(α∗)) = μΛ2 9μ−4


















2 (3μ − 4)
64−81μ2−12μ
(9μ−8)2(3μ−2)2 < 0. (A.4)






A < 0 may hold also when relaxing Assumption A1. For μ ∈ (8/9,16/9), RA(K)−C(k)−C(k) is
strictly convex in k,w h e r eμ>8/9 is required from the SOC associated with the incumbent’s investment
in (5.2), 9μ − 8α>0,w h e r eα ∈ [0,1].F o rμ>16/9, RA(K) − C(k) − C(k) is strictly concave in k as
illustrated in Figure ??.


















(9μ−16)(3μ−2) > 0 holds from assumption A1.
A.3. Overinvestment with asymmetric incumbents
Applying the Linear-Quadratic Cournot (LQC) model described in Section 6 to the FOC























SL hold when θS = θL under the
assumption ¯ cS − ¯ cL > 0.
Moreover, k∗
V =a r g m a x k wSL(k) − C(k) and k∗
L =a r g m a x k RLL(k) − C(k).T h u s ,
k∗
V = k∗














SL. Substituting (A.5) into these expressions and solving for
the critical ex-ante diﬀerence ∆c =¯ cS − ¯ cL for which R0
LL = R0
SS − R0






I nt h ec a s ew h e r eθS = θL = θ, ∆c = a−θk
9 > 0. We then have underinvestment in the
venture-backed ﬁrm (k∗
V <k ∗
L)i ft h ee x - a n t ec o s td i ﬀerence is suﬃciently large, ¯ cS −¯ cL >
∆c, but overinvestment (k∗
V >k ∗
L)i ft h ee x - a n t ec o s td i ﬀerences are suﬃciently low,
0 < ¯ cS − ¯ cL < ∆c. Finally, note that if there is an ex-post advantage of the smaller ﬁrm
θS >θ L, an even larger ex-ante diﬀerence ∆c is required to generate underinvestment in
the venture-backed ﬁrm.
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